On the size of the official Ayyubid army and group loyalty

Numbers are frequently inflated in premodern texts. Sometimes the estimate comes as a surprise. The day's surprise comes from Maqrizi of the Mamluk period. It's surprising because it's realistic. 

Al Maqrizi (15th-century):

I found in the manuscript of al-As'ad Ibn Mammātī that the number of soldiers in Egypt at the time of Ruzzīq ibn Şalih Talā'i ibn Ruzzīq was forty thousand horsemen, thirty-six thou-sand galleys carrying ten thousand fighting men. And this toward the end of the Fāțimid state!

After Sultan al-Malik al-Nāşir Şalāḥ al-Din Yūsuf ibn Ayyüb had put an end to their regime, he rid the Egyptian army of the black slave troops, the Egyptian emirs, the Bedouins, the Armenians, and others, and recruited Kurds and Turks as his personal troops. The strength of his army in Egypt came to exactly twelve thousand horsemen.

After his death, that number broke up, and only 8,500 horsemen were left with his son, al-Malik al-'Azīz 'Uthman, in Egypt. Among these, however, were some with ten vassals, some with twenty, some with even more, up to a hundred vassals to a single trooper, so that when they rode in parade outside Cairo, they numbered more than two hundred thousand.

Subsequently, they continued to disintegrate and to quar-rel among themselves, until their state came to an end with the putsch of their Turkish slave troops. These then imitated their (for-mer) masters, the Ayyübids, and restricted themselves to Turks and some Kurds (as troops). They recruited a great many slaves that were imported from the land of the Turks, so that the mamluks of al-Malik al-Manşür Qalāwün are said to have numbered seven thousand-or ten thousand, according to others, and the number of the mamluks of his son al-Ashraf Khalil ibn Qalāwūn was twelve thousand. Al-Qādī al-Fadil reports among the events of the year 567

(A.D. 1171/2): On the 8th of Muharram (September 11), Saladin's or-ders came out for the troops, old and new, to mount up and ride in review, after all units, present and absent, had been put on alert earlier. Their arrival complete, their armament and horses replen-ished, huge numbers of troops were present on that day. No Mus-lim ruler, as many a wisened whitebeard could attest, had ever pos-sessed the like of them, and the emissaries of the Byzantines and Franks witnessed a spectacle to twist the infidels' noses. The march-past of the troops continued, column after column, tulb af-ter tulb-tulb, in the language of the Turkomans, means a senioremir entitled to a standard and a bugler, and commanding from two hundred to one hundred to seventy knights-until the day was over and night fell and it was daylight again. And their parade was still not finished. The number of troops present was 147 battalions, with twenty battalions absent, and is estimated at close to 14,000 knights, most of them tawashisa tawāshī is one receiving an al-lowance of anywhere from seven hundred to one thousand one hundred and twenty (dinars), who has a baggage train of ten head or less, consisting of horses, packhorses, mules and camels, and a slave to carry his arms and Qarāghulāmiyyah making up the rest.

In that year, says (al-Qādī al-Fadil), Saladin also reviewed the Judhām bedouins, who mustered seven thousand horsemen (at the time). Their strength was fixed at no more than thirteen hundred horsemen, and on that basis the canonical tithe was collected. (The basis) was originally one million dinars [in terms of a computation which, although established in principle, is not collectible], and that was now settled on the Thalabah, who were much upset about it and hinted they might go over to the side of the Franks.

 Among the events of the month of Rajab (November/De-cember) of the year 577 (A.D. 1181) he reports: Sultan Saladin con-tinued in that year to look into the affairs of the fiefs and to find out about their cadastrally assessed values, whether they had been increased or decreased, (in an effort) to nail down what was illegaland to encourage meritorious practice, until in the end the effec-tive troop strength was fixed at 8,640 horse. 

The funds set aside for them came to 3,670,000 dinars, and that ex-clusive of: troopers stripped of their benefices and put on tithe pensions; Arab nomads with land grants in the Sharqiyyah and Buhayrah provinces; Kinānah and Egyptian contingents; ju-risconsults, judges and Sufis; and what falls under the jurisdiction of the (special) dīwāns no less than one million dinars.

Why would Saladin modify the demographics of Egypt's army when he took over? Loyalty was the primary consideration. The recruiting of Turkish troops may not be particularly flattering. There is a long history of why rulers of Islamicate history enlisted Turkish troops. They were known for being faithful servants to their masters, as well as low-risk, cost-effective fighters. Mirrors for princes dating back even further than the Ayyubids provide recommendations for Turkish troops because they were plainly viewed as great cannon fodder. The ayyubids continued to follow the same custom. The ayyubids' decision to recruit and place Kurds at the forefront is an interesting but expected recruitment. That was also a loyalty-based decision. That link was strengthened by cultural affinity, similar to the decision of the Ayyubids to fill the literati spots of their empire with Kurds and other Iranians.

The link associated with groups influenced political calculations and the analyses/choices that premodern people made in their daily lives. According to Ibn Khallikan, the Ayyubids prioritized this aspect from the start.

Ibn Khallikan (13th-century):

During the negotiations relating to the investiture to the Fatimid vizierate, 'Isâ al-Hakkârî, a Kurd, persuaded Qutb al-Dîn Tulayl to drop his candidacy in favor of Saladin: "Saladin and you are both from the same group. He is from kurdish origin (inna aslahu min al-akrâd). Then you won't let the power pass to the Turks. He promised to increase his income. So he obeyed Saladin (atâ'ahu)".

Ibn Khaldun has interesting words to give on the connection between religious propaganda and group feeling in Islamicate history, where religious discourses served as a cloak for the real ambitions. 

Ibn Khaldun (15th-century):

Religious propaganda cannot materialize without group feeling. This is because, as we have mentioned before, every mass (political) undertaking by necessity requires group feeling. This is indicated in the afore-mentioned tradition: "God sent no prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his people." If this was the case with the prophets, who are among human beings those most likely to perform wonders, one would (expect it to apply) all the more so to others. One cannot expect them to be able to work the wonder of achieving superiority without group feeling.

It happened to the Sufi shaykh Ibn Qasi, the author of the Kitab Khal' an-na'layn on Sufism. He rose in revolt in Spain and made propaganda for the truth shortly before the time when the propaganda of the Mahdi (of the Almohads) started. His followers were called al-Murabitun (Ibn Qasi) had some success, because the Lamtunah (Almoravids) were preoccupied with their own difficulties with the Almohads. (But) there were no groups and tribes there to defend him. When the Almohads took over control of the Maghrib, he soon obeyed them and participated in their cause. He took the oath of allegiance to them at his stronghold, the fortress of Arcos (de la Frontera). He handed his frontier province over to them and became their first missionary in Spain. His revolt was called the revolt of the Murabitun.

To this chapter belong cases of revolutionaries from among the common people and of jurists who undertake to reform evil (practices). Many religious people who follow the ways of religion come to revolt against unjust amirs. They call for a change in, and prohibition of, evil (practices) and for good practices. They hope for a divine reward for what they do. They gain many followers and sympathizers among the great mass of the people, but they risk being killed, and most of them actually do perish in consequence of their activities as sinners and unrewarded, because God had not destined them for such (activities as they undertake). He commands such activities to be undertaken only where there-exists the power to bring them to a successful conclusion. Muhammad said: "Should one among you see evil activities, he should change them with his hand. If he cannot do that, he should change them with his tongue. And if he cannot do that, he should change them with his heart." 

Rulers and dynasties are strongly entrenched. Their foundations can be undermined and destroyed only through strong efforts backed by the group feeling of tribes and families, as we have mentioned before. Similarly, prophets in their religious propaganda depended on groups and families, though they were the ones who could have been supported by God with anything in existence, if He had wished, but in His wisdom He permitted matters to take their customary course.

If someone who is on the right path were to attempt (religious reforms) in this way, (his) isolation would keep him from (gaining the support of) group feeling, and he would perish. If someone merely pretends to (achieve religious reforms) in order to gain (political) leadership, he deserves to be hampered by obstacles and to fall victim to perdition. (Religious reforms) are a divine matter that materializes only with God's pleasure and support, through sincere devotion for Him and in view of good intentions towards the Muslims. No Muslim, no person of insight, could doubt this (truth).

In Islam, the first person to start that sort of thing in Baghdad was a certain Khalid ad-Daryush. Tahir had revolted. Al-Amin was killed. Al-Ma'mun in Khurasin was slowed down in his advance toward the 'Iraq, and he appointed 'Ali b. Musa ar-Rida, a descendant of al-Husayn, successor to the throne. The 'Abbasids showed their disapproval (of that move). They banded together in order to revolt and to renounce obedience to al-Ma'mun and to choose some one else in his stead. Allegiance was sworn to Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi. Trouble broke out in Baghdad. The troublesome elements among the underworld and the soldiery were given a free hand against the decent citizens. They robbed the people and filled their pockets with loot, which they sold openly in the markets. The inhabitants turned for protection to the authorities, but these did not help them. The religious and good citizens, thereupon, united in order to stop the criminals and to put an end to their misdeeds. At that moment, a man named Khalid ad-Daryush appeared in Baghdad. He appealed to the people to obey the law. Many responded to his call. They fought the troublesome elements and defeated them. Khalid had them beaten and punished. After him, there appeared another man from among the populace of Baghdad, by name Abu Hatim Sahl b. Salamah al-Ansari. He hung a copy of the Qur'an around his neck, and appealed to the people to obey the law and to act in accordance with the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. High and low, Hashimites and others, all followed him. He established himself in the palace of Tahir and took over the government office(s). He went about Baghdad, kept out all those who were frightening wayfarers, and put an end to the payment of protection money to the underworld. When Khalid adDaryush said to him that he (Khalid) was not against the government, Sahl replied that he (for his part) was fighting all those who acted contrary to the Qur'an and the Sunnah, whoever they might be. This happened in the year 201 [817]. Ibrahim b. al-Mahdi sent an army against (Sahl). He was defeated and captured, and his power quickly dissolved. He barely escaped with his life.

Later on, many deluded individuals followed, that example. They took it upon themselves to establish the truth. They did not know that they would need group feeling for that. They did not realize how their enterprise must necessarily end and what they would come to. With respect to such people, it is necessary to adopt one of the following courses. One may either treat them, if they are insane, or one may punish them either by execution or beatings when they cause trouble, or one may ridicule them and treat them as buffoons. 

Some of these people allied themselves with the Expected Fatimid. They pretended to be, either he himself, or one of his missionaries, despite their ignorance of everything concerning the Fatimid. Most men who adopt such ideas will be found to be, either deluded and crazy, or to be swindlers who, with the help of such claims, seek to obtain (political) leadership -which they crave and would be unable to obtain in the natural manner. They believe that such claims will be instrumental in bringing to them the fulfillment of their hopes. They do not consider the disaster that will overtake them in consequence. The trouble they create will speedily cause their death and bring their trickery to a bitter end.

At the beginning of this century, a man of Sufi leanings, by name at-Tuwayziri, appeared in as-Sus. He went to the Mosque of Massah on the shore of the Mediterranean and pretended to be the Expected Fatimid. He was taking advantage of the common people's firm belief in predictions to the effect that the Fatimid was about to appear and that his mission would originate at that Mosque. A number of ordinary Berber groups were attracted to him like moths (to the flame). Their chiefs then feared that the revolt might spread. The leader of the Masmudah at that time, 'Umar asSaksiwi, secretly sent someone to him, who killed him in his bed.

Also at the beginning of this century, a man known as al-'Abbas appeared among the Ghumarah. He made a similar claim. The lowest among the stupid and imbecile members of those tribes followed his blethering. He marched on Badis, one of the (Ghumarah) cities, and entered it by force. He was then killed, forty days after the start of his mission. He perished like those before him. 

There are many similar cases. The mistake (they all make) is that they disregard the significance of group feeling (for success) in such matters. If deceit is involved, it is better that such a person should not succeed and be made to pay for his crime. "That is the sinners' reward."